

COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN KENYA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2005

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 17-06-2005		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) Aug 2004 - Jun 2005	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN KENYA AND WHETHER THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORT TO FIGHT TERRORISM IS EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING THE TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT IN THE COUNTRY.				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ADAN HARED H.				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
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15. SUBJECT TERMS KENYAN GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO FIGHT TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT IN THE COUNTRY					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	UU	97	

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN KENYA AND WHETHER THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO FIGHT TERRORISM IS EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING THE TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT IN THE COUNTRY
by Hared H. Adan, Kenya Army, 84 pages.

This thesis examines the Kenyan government's (GoK's) increasingly responsive strategy, and its implementation, in combating transnational terrorism focusing on the case studies of the 1998 US Embassy bombing and the 2002 terrorist attacks in Mombasa, Kenya.

The analytical research methodology used is the qualitative case study method. It identifies the factors regarding why terrorists targeted Kenya, how Kenya reacted, and the perceived improvements in Kenya's response to these attacks. Deeper analysis is done by means of analyzing Kenya's use of traditional and nontraditional instruments of power in its war on terrorism. They are identified and assessed, based on the two case studies, through the submission of questionnaires to an independent panel of experts knowledgeable on Kenya's fight against transnational terrorism.

The analysis of the response indicates that the Kenyan government was moderately effective in employing the instruments of power between 1998 and 2001. After the 2002 terrorist attacks, it effectively applied the instruments of power to mitigate the threat and developed a comprehensive national strategy against transnational terrorism.

The conclusion of this study is that while the Kenyan government's counterterrorism strategy is becoming increasingly more effective in combating transnational terrorism in terms of the strategy's ends and ways, it falls short of applying the appropriate means in reducing the underlying conditions that make Kenya an easy target for terrorist acts. Recommendations, both short-term and long-term, are proposed to assist the GoK in conducting an even more effective counterterrorism strategy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank very sincerely my committee for their invaluable contribution to this research. I would especially like to thank the chairman of the committee Dr. Michael Mihalka and Douglas E. Lathrop who have gone out of their way to shape this paper. I would also like to thank Christopher Morey of TRAC US Army and Colonel Philip Kameru, Colonel Francis Kimeu Nthenge and Lieutenant Colonel Ayub Matiiri (Department of Defence Kenya) for their contribution. Finally, I would like to thank the Fort Leavenworth library staff, specifically Mr. Michael J. Browne, for their tireless efforts in providing the necessary research materials, without which the end state of this paper would have been unattainable.

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ACRONYMS

AIZ	Arkia Israeli Airline
AIAI	Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic
GOK	Government of Kenya
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
EACTI	East African Counterterrorism Initiative
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
AU	Africa Union

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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

Kenya experienced two terrorist incidents within a five-year span: the 1998 US Embassy bombing and in 2002, the terrorist attack at an Israeli-owned hotel and the surface-to-air missile attacks on an Israeli airliner taking off from the Mombassa airport. These incidents brought the problem of transnational terrorism to the attention of the Kenyan government (GoK). The pattern of incidents indicated that the primary terrorist targets were US and Israeli interests. The 2002 terrorist incident in Mombassa, masterminded by Fazul Abdullahi Mohammed (alias Abdul Karim), the East African Al Qaeda cell leader, was considered a failure because it did not achieve the high number of casualties the terrorists desired, but there still existed a terrorist threat instigated by Al Qaeda against US interests in Kenya (Mutinga 2004).

Fazul Abdullahi Mohammed operated from Siyu Island in the Lamu district on the Kenyan coast. There, in 2003, he planned to attack the newly built US Embassy in the Gigiri section of Nairobi. Two groups of terrorists were to attack the Embassy. One group was to use a truck, which was to be supplied by the terror masterminds and delivered to Eastleigh, on the outskirts of Nairobi, before being driven to the new US Embassy in Gigiri. The second team was to board a plane bound for Somalia, hijack the plane en route, and crash it into the US Embassy. The government was able to thwart these plans and subsequently apprehended the suspects. Mohammed had arrived on Siyu Island in June 2002, married a Kenyan girl, and founded three football teams for local youth. The names of the teams were Al Qaeda, Kandahar, and Kabul (Mutinga 2004). The ease with

which Fazul Abdullahi Mohammed insinuated himself into Kenyan society raised questions about the GoK's ability to combat transnational terrorism.

Thesis Question

This thesis will attempt to answer the following question: Is the Kenyan government's efforts to fight terrorism effective in reducing the transnational terrorism threat in the country? The primary research for this study is based on an analysis of two case studies. The following secondary questions will also be addressed:

1. What is the GoK's response to transnational terrorism in Kenya as reflected by the case studies?
2. What role has the international community played in helping Kenya fight transnational terrorism?
3. Is the GoK's response to combating transnational terrorism effective?
4. How can the GoK minimize the strategy's shortcomings while maximizing its overall effectiveness?

Background

The terrorist incidents in Kenya demonstrate clearly that terrorism is, and will remain, one of the GoK's main concerns. These terrorist attacks conform to an emerging trend in international terrorism striking far beyond terrorism's traditional operational theaters in Europe and the Middle East. These attacks away from their traditional theaters are possible because of weak law enforcement and the availability of soft targets. From the patterns of the attacks, the primary transnational terrorist threat to Kenya is from Al Qaeda, aimed at US and Israeli interests. In the Horn of Africa region, Al Qaeda has been

working closely with the Somali Islamist organization Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), whose central objective is to create an Islamic government in Somalia based on Islamic Sharia law. Al Qaeda has, through the ideology of a defensive jihad against the US, been able to recruit many members and has, in Kenya, the potential of converting more to their creed.

Before the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Kenya, Osama bin-Laden publicly declared war on the United States, because of its support for Israel and the presence of US military forces in Saudi Arabia, and issued a *fatwa* (religious order or proclamation), using incontrovertible theology as well as political justification to encourage violence. In the wake of this edict, an estimated four to five thousand individuals scattered throughout the Muslim world reportedly pledged loyalty to Bin Laden and are allegedly prepared to follow his summons to battle (Hoffman 1998, 207). Bin Laden has made good his threat, as evidenced by the simultaneous attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the barbaric 11 September 2001 attacks in America.

Although the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Nairobi demonstrated the presence of terrorists groups in Kenya, the government took a long time to acknowledge the threat. This delay was caused by the perception that Kenya was a victim because of its geographical location and political stability, rather than a source of international terrorism, which resulted in a systemic denial (Khadiagala 2004, 3). The government was also afraid to confront, and risk alienating, Kenyan Muslims who compose 10 percent of the country's population and who would bear the brunt of any counterterrorism efforts since most of the terrorist suspects are from the Muslim community (CIA 2004). The government's official denial of the terrorist threat was further fueled by an inability or

unwillingness to acknowledge the wider context that led to the growth of terrorism, which would imply an admission of the erosion of governance structures, notably weak intelligence capabilities and law enforcement. To mitigate the threat, the GoK has initiated measures to fight terrorism and has joined the US in its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This research will analyze the GoK response based on the case studies.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this research is to assess the GoK's response to combating transnational terrorism based on the two case studies and to identify strengths and weaknesses of the measures. Such an assessment will validate current practice or suggest ways to refine current policy and explore alternative ways and means to combat transnational terrorism. The findings will ultimately provide the GoK with information to use to develop an effective policy to combat the transnational terrorist threat in Kenya.

Assumptions

This thesis is based on the following assumptions: Kenya will continue to be a terrorist target. Terrorists will continue to target US, Israeli, and other Western countries' interests in Kenya.

Definitions

In almost all languages, one word often has multiple meanings. To ensure consistency, it is necessary to define some of the words used in this study. The research will use the Kenya National Counterterrorism Strategy to define terrorism. Other definitions are from Joint Publication 3-07-1-1, *Department of Defense Combating*

Terrorism Program, since the Kenya national counterterrorism strategy does not define some of the terms.

Center of Gravity. Centers of gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is mostly the direct path to victory. In terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, Bin Laden is considered the center of gravity in this thesis (FM 3-0 2001, 5-6).

Combating Terrorism. “Combating terrorism are actions including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. The concept of counterterrorism covers all legitimate means used to combat terrorism”(JP 3-07-1-1 2000).

Fatwa. Fatwa is an Arabic word for a religious order or proclamation.

Hawala. Hawala is a nonbanking system of money transfer that is widely used by immigrants in the various part of the world to remit money to their dependants. This system does not involve any paper trail in the transaction and is based on trust. It is widely used in Kenya and Somalia.

Imam. The term will be used when analyzing the roles of the Imams in the Islamic radicalism in Kenya. It is used in Islam for denoting a person with special qualities relevant to Islam. In general, he is the most learned and most respected person in the assembly who leads others in prayers (*Encyclopedia of the Orient*, s.v. “Imam,” 2004).

Jihad. “Essentially jihad means struggle. It comes from the Arabic verb jahada: to strive, struggle, fight. Muslim jurists have identified two types of Jihad in the religious

sense. The Greater Jihad (al-jihad al-akbar) refers to the personal struggle of the heart, where the believer strives to overcome personal temptations and the carnal self. This inner struggle is the highest form of Jihad. Here Muslims strive to internalize the Islamic message through such prescribed actions as prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. The Lesser Jihad (al-jihad al-asghar) is the outward struggle of the Muslim against the enemies of the faith. This struggle requires the use of the tongue, the hands, or the sword. It is only with the sword that Muslims actually engage in mortal combat by taking arms against Islam's adversaries"(Gawrych n.d).

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is the successor organization to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), created in 1986 by six drought-stricken East African countries to coordinate development in the Horn of Africa. IGAD headquarters are in Djibouti. IGAD is engaged in Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, and Humanitarian Affairs; Infrastructure Development and Food Security and Environment Protection. IGAD seeks to foster regional security and sustain economic development in the Horn of Africa region (US Department of State 2003).

Madrasas. This is an Arabic word for a Muslim religious seminary.

Terrorism. "Terrorism is the intentional infliction of suffering or loss of one party by another party, which has no authority or legitimacy. An alternative definition is the use of indiscriminate violence to intimidate the general majority of people in a state to accept the changes advocated by the terrorists. The essence of terrorism is to kill or injure opponents in ways specifically designed to cause fear and, thus, to disorganize the

opposing society to a degree far out of proportion to the number of victims” (Kenya National Counterterrorism Strategy 2004, 1).

Transnational Terrorism. “Actions carried out by autonomous nonstate actors whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states” (Schmid 1983, 258).

Limitations

Many books have been written on terrorism in general; however, no specific book addresses the GoK’s response to the transnational terrorist threat. Because of the sensitivity of counterterrorism, specific aspects of the GoK strategy are classified. As a result, this research relies extensively on information from secondary sources, interviews with people knowledgeable of Kenya’s counterterrorism measures, and the personal experience of the author as a member of a Kenyan government security organization. The other limitations are that, because of time constraints, data were not available and that there is a lack of people with expertise on the topic as it applies to Kenya specifically.

Delimitation

Based on the two case studies, the research will focus on the GoK’s response to the transnational terrorism threat where Kenya is the location of the attack but Western and Israeli interests are the target. The research will also examine the international community’s response in assisting the GoK in combating transnational terrorism.

Why Do Terrorists Target Kenya?

A number of factors help explain why Kenya has been a victim of past terrorist attacks. The main factors are geography, ethnic composition, political stability, unstable neighbors, poverty, Islamic fundamentalism, and lax law enforcement.

Kenya's geography and geographic location contribute to making Kenya an attractive terrorist target. Kenya's strategic location makes it a significant gateway from the Middle East and South Asia to East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Because it is a geographic gateway, Kenya has developed a major seaport at Mombassa, international airports in Mombassa and Nairobi, and extensive rail, road, and communications infrastructure throughout the country. In addition, Kenya is relatively easy to enter and travel within undetected, because of its porous borders shared with its five neighbors, and its long, largely unmonitored coastline. This combination of infrastructure and porous borders makes Kenya an attractive target and an easy conduit for terrorist-related materiel, activities, and transit points (Barkan and Cooke October 2001).

The Kenyan coastal region is widely inhabited by Arabs who have strong historical and cultural ties with the Arabs in the Middle East. Because of the common religion and language, terrorists can easily blend into the coastal community. For example, Fazul Abdullahi Mohammed operated from Siyu Island in the Lamu district on the Kenyan coast for a long time without the authorities detecting him (Mutinga 2004).

Kenya's political stability since independence, combined with its geostrategic importance, has led it to be recognized by Western countries as a major hub for economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities for the East African and Horn of Africa region. The United States has maintained military access agreements with the

GoK that have permitted the US military use of Kenyan sea and air bases for the past several decades. These facilities helped provide humanitarian assistance in the early 1990s to Somalia and Sudan and to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide and served as a power-projection platform to the Persian Gulf region.

Kenya is also home to the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention's largest operation outside the United States and one of the four countries targeted by the United States Agency for International Development to receive significant increases in resources to fight HIV/AIDS (Barkan and Cooke 2001). Because of its wildlife and well developed tourism sector, Kenya is also a significant tourist destination for Westerners. The many tourist's resorts, diplomatic missions, and business investments in Kenya present attractive terrorist targets because they are seen as soft targets.

Political instability in the neighboring country of Somalia enables expansion of terrorist interest into Somalia and, thus, into Kenya. For example, Somalia's collapse in 1991 tremendously affected Kenya's security. The lack of a government in Somalia for the last 14 years has allowed unimpeded movement of terrorists across the common border. Somalia's collapse brought an influx of Somali refugees into Kenya, allowing terrorists to blend in with the refugees, move freely across the border, and easily import terrorism into Kenya.

Poverty and widespread unemployment have made Kenyan youths vulnerable to indoctrination and recruitment for terrorist activities. Kenya has a young population (40.6 percent are under the age of 15) and an unemployment rate of 40 percent (CIA 2004). Terrorists also bring money into Kenya and are able to entice many from the unemployed and poverty-stricken to support their cause, wittingly or unwittingly, and to provide new

recruits to the cause to enhance situational awareness and gather local intelligence for terrorist activities.

Elements of Islamic fundamentalism have been invading Kenya from the east through Somalia and along the Kenyan coast. This encroachment has resulted in a growing dissent among the Muslim population, making them easy recruits for terrorist activities. In Kenyan mosques, individual Imams preach about perceived injustice to their Muslim brothers in Afghanistan, the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the ongoing war in Iraq. Aided by technology, in the form of the Internet, satellite TV, and Kenyan's increased travel and employment around the globe, Muslims in Kenya are becoming more globally aware. Individual Imams are using this increased global awareness to encourage Kenyan empathy with more extreme views of the needs, hardships, and philosophies of their core religion worldwide (Moustapha 2002).

Finally, lax law enforcement has made Kenya easily accessible to terrorists organizations. The Global War on Terrorism has dismantled terrorist sanctuaries, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia, but this has forced terrorists to look for safer and more accessible operational environments. Kenya, which had a relatively lax security mandate during the regime of President Daniel Arab Moi, has provided the ideal environment for terrorists to exploit and infiltrate into the country.

Impact of Terrorism on Kenya

Acts of terrorism have had grave economic, political, and social implications in Kenya. Human lives, tourism, agriculture, and the transportation sectors have been severely affected. Tourism, which is the driving force of the economy, accounts for 25 percent of the GDP and has been paralyzed because of on-again/off-again travel bans

imposed by the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and other countries since 11 September 2001 (Lecey 2004). Germany and Great Britain have lifted the ban completely, but the United States continues to issue advisories periodically. Because of the travel bans, many Kenyans have lost their jobs, which directly affects the economy. The government also has lost a major source of revenue from its formal sector of the economy.

The disruption of tea exports has also affected Kenya's economy. Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively, were the world's second and third largest importers of tea from Kenya. Because of the social and economic impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States and subsequent military operations in Afghanistan, exports to these markets have been disrupted, consequently creating a loss of much-needed revenue.

From July to November 2001, the Kenyan government closed the Kenya-Somalia border because of security and subsequently banned flights to Somalia (Barkan and Cooke 2001). While this was viewed as necessary because of the perception that Somalia harbored terrorists and the fear that terrorists might hijack aircraft for suicide missions in Kenya, this further resulted in the loss of revenue from trade and travel, which especially affected the transportation sector.

The impending strikes of US-led forces against terrorist targets and those harboring them forced shipping lines to introduce a war surcharge to cover risks. The surcharge was passed on to importers, increasing the cost of imported goods. Kenya's economy has also seen an increase in third-party insurance by the airline industry, which paralyzed the national carrier, Kenya Airways. The government had to underwrite the

third-party risks, creating an increase of insurance premiums, which subsequently increased airfares. In turn, the increased airfares affected both Kenyans and international travelers flying on the national carrier (Ghirmazion 2001).

Summary

Terrorism, a contemporary issue that affects many governments around the world, has gained international attention because of its overall effect on nation-states and societies. Two significant terrorist incidents in Kenya within a five-year span made it evident that Kenya's geographical location, sociopolitical and ethnic characteristics, unstable neighbors, spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and lax law enforcement make it attractive to terrorism. Past terrorist incidents have had grave economic, political, and social implications, and the possibility of future terrorist attacks must not be ignored. This research will assess the GoK's response to transnational terrorist threats, based on two case studies, and will begin with a review and analysis of literature relevant to terrorism in Kenya.

CHAPTER 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Many scholars have researched the phenomenon of terrorism in order to understand its cause and to identify potential remedies. This has resulted in numerous articles and books on the topic. This chapter reviews some of the literature on terrorism of specific value to the proposed research topic. Data and materials collected are classified into four categories:

1. Terrorist organizational structure and leadership
2. A review of the causes of terrorism
3. Counterterrorism measures
4. Impact of terrorism in Kenya

Organizational Structure and Leadership

Terrorist organizations are structured to function in the environment in which they are to operate. Unlike conventional forces, terrorists have only strategic and tactical levels of organization. By design, they lack the operational level of organization and are commonly described as horizontally structured organizations because of the hostile environment within which they operate. As a result, they are organized into small cells with each cell relatively isolated and performing specific functions, such as intelligence-gathering and logistical operations (JP 3-07-1-1 2000). This organizational structure guarantees security in the event of the defection, capture, or killing of a member since no

one member can identify more than a few others. This assures the organization's security and continuity.

However, as pointed out by Bruce Hoffman in *Inside Terrorism*, terrorism has reinvented itself in a more decentralized form (Hoffman 1998, 208-209). As older established terrorists structures are dismantled, as happened in Afghanistan, more radical and decentralized organizations often take their place, as is happening in Iraq. The new types of small, decentralized transnational terrorists groups impose new challenges because they lack a discernible organizational structure with a distinguishable chain of command. This small, decentralized organizational structure guarantees the continued existence and survival of terrorists groups.

Leadership provides strategic guidance to the terrorists and, in most cases, is what holds groups together. For example, Osama bin-Laden has a large following among radical Islamic groups and seems to be a symbol of unity in the Al Qaeda terrorist network's structure. In "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism," Rex A. Hudson points out that most terrorist leaders tend to be well educated and capable of sophisticated, albeit highly biased, political analysis. For example, the new generation of terrorists leaders, such as Osama bin-Laden, are well educated and motivated by their religious ideologies (Hudson 1990, 90). Leadership provides the strategic guidance—the ends, ways, and means to achieve the organization's strategic objectives. In the event of a loss of leadership, hierarchies exist to promote new leadership. This form of decentralized command and leadership has held Al Qaeda together in spite of the GWOT. A decentralized organizational structure makes it difficult to detect and eliminate terrorist groups. An area counterterrorism strategy must focus on is identifying terrorists

organizations' center of gravity, the most essential element(s), which must be identified and targeted to create the desired effects on neutralizing or destroying a terrorist organization's ability to act.

Causes of Terrorism

A number of factors breed terrorism. However, the most common factors cited in most of the literature reviewed are external support, repressive governments, religious extremist ideologists, and socioeconomic conditions among some Muslim populations.

Terrorist groups need safe havens, intelligence on the environment they will operate in, training and recruitment bases, logistic support, and other infrastructure. These can only be achieved by obtaining external support to sustain their acts of terror. In *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*, Paul Pillar identifies some of the external state sponsors of transnational terrorism, such as the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, Libya, and North Korea (Pillar 2001, 158). Nonetheless, as Tom Regan points out in his article, "CIA Think Tank: Iraq Training Ground for Terrorists," with the dismantling of the Al Qaeda structure in Afghanistan, Iraq has become a new safe haven and training ground for terrorists and is becoming a magnet for international terrorist activity (Regan 2005). Pillar also cites financing as a key to international terrorism survival, naming financial support as a principle part of state sponsorship of terrorism and the most important part of the assistance some states have given to some terrorist groups (Pillar 2001, 92-93). Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy further identify the emergence of Islamic agencies funded by wealthy Saudi and other Persian Gulf states, which have supported and sustained terrorism (Campbell and Flournoy 2001, 255-56). In Kenya, terrorists have found readily available internal support from some sections of the

population that have enabled them to conduct two successful terrorists attacks. External support, which is the lifeblood of terrorism, provides terrorists money needed for recruitment, training, indoctrination, and execution of transnational terrorism. This is an area on which counterterrorism strategies and efforts should be focused to deny terrorists their lifeblood.

The grievances of minorities concerning their perceived lack of political and civil rights can often trigger violence. As such, international experts, at a meeting in 2003 in Oslo, discussed terrorism's root causes. They determined that some of the causes included lack of democracy, inequality of power, illegitimate or corrupt governments, and the expression of social injustice and failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes (Bjoro 2003). The experts pointed out that terrorism occurs in wealthy countries as well as poor countries, and in democracies as well as in authoritarian states. Thus, there exists no single root cause or even a common set of causes. However, there are a number of preconditions and precipitants for the emergence of various forms of terrorism. In Kenya, there is a perceived political marginalization of some segments of the population, especially in coastal and northeastern regions, which gives terrorists groups a perceived legitimacy for agitating and spreading their form of rule through violence and indoctrination, as witnessed by the propaganda being spread by Bin Laden and his lieutenants. The government needs to confront the root causes of terrorism and act to reduce the perceived problem.

Religious extremist ideologies often lead to the spread of terrorism. Former Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu attributes the source of terrorism to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviets used terrorism as a weapon during communist

struggles in many western strongholds (Netanyahu 2001, 52-57). However, Netanyahu fails to analyze the development of terrorism during the 1980s when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. That invasion triggered a war fought by Muslim volunteers (Mujahideens) as a Jihad to counter and reverse Soviet expansion. According to John L. Esposito, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent covert operations to dislodge them from the region propelled individuals like Bin Laden into international politics concerning Muslims (Esposito 2002, 10-11). Jakkie Cilliers and Sturman Kathryn claim that after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the fundamentalism carried by the Mujahideens returning from the Jihad spread rapidly in North Africa and Asia and soon affected Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan (Cilliers and Sturman 2002). Therefore, one could logically claim that the current global terrorism is linked directly to the 1979-1989 wars in Afghanistan against the Soviets, which produced indoctrinated and hardened Jihad veterans who have since then been spreading their militancy to other parts of the world.

According to Moustapha Hassouna, in his article on why radicals find fertile grounds in Kenya, technology, such as the internet and satellite television, as well as increased travel and employment around the globe, has resulted in making Kenyan Muslims more informed of what is happening globally (Moustapha 2002). This increased awareness was especially highlighted in the conflict in the Middle East and Iraq and the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is important to note that many Muslims along the Kenyan coast share a common religion, language, and significant aspects of their culture with the Muslims in the Middle East. Because of these factors, an element of radicalism has invaded Kenya from the east through Somalia and along the Kenyan coast.

This encroachment breeds dissent among some sections of the Muslim community, which makes them easy targets for terrorist activities.

Economic imbalance also contributes to terrorism. In their analysis of terrorism in Africa, Campbell and Flournoy acknowledge the roles marginalization and poverty play among the Muslims that invite sectarian and inter-ethnic strife, despair, and anti-Western resentment (Campbell and Flournoy 2001, 255-56). They also note the emergence of Islamic agencies, funded by Saudi and other Persian Gulf states and individuals, which are addressing the social problems of Muslim communities while sowing seeds of discord and anti-Western sentiment and recruiting and providing safe havens for terrorist organizations.

Pillar supports this view, noting that terrorism and terrorist groups “do not arise randomly and they are not distributed evenly around the globe” (Pillar 2001, 30). He attributes the living standard and socioeconomic deprivation of some segments of society as the breeding stock for terrorists: “Terrorism is a risky, dangerous, and very disagreeable business.” Few people who have a reasonably good life will be inclined to become terrorists. Pillar believes cutting out roots can be useful. However, he acknowledges that if all root causes were somehow removed, there would always remain a core of incorrigibles, such as Bin Laden and his inner circle (Pillar 2001, 30-32).

All of the authors mentioned touch on the common factors that cause some sections of the Kenyan population to lean toward joining terrorist groups--poverty and widespread unemployment. Kenyans are especially vulnerable to indoctrination and terrorist recruitment in exchange for financial gain. Thus, economic deprivation enables

terrorist groups to exploit and recruit foot soldiers from the poor segment of the population.

Counterterrorism Measures

The subject of counterterrorism and how to effectively conduct it has become a popular topic in current literature. Some elements of an effective counterterrorism strategy relevant to this research, cited by various authors, are public diplomacy and information campaigns; legislation; financial controls and socioeconomic development; use of military force; and creation of a specialized judicial system for terrorism suspects.

Money is the lifeblood for terrorist groups and without it the likelihood that they could sustain transnational attacks is remote. However, unlike narcotics smuggling or money laundering, the salient characteristic of terrorism is that it is cheap. For example, the first attempt to topple the World Trade Center in 1993 is estimated to have cost only \$400. The small sums involved made the movement of money difficult to track. As Pillar asserts, financial controls are primarily of symbolic significance (Pillar 2001, 94).

Contrary to Pillar's opinion, the use of financial controls is not primarily of symbolic significance but is effective when applied rigorously. For example, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US cost between \$400, 000 and \$500,000 to execute, and operatives spent more than \$270,000 in the United States. But, in terms of loss of life and property, insurance companies alone lost an estimated \$40 billion. Al Qaeda had many sources of funding with a pre-11 September annual budget estimated at \$30 million (Thomas et al. 2004). Had an effective financial-control system existed in the US, the millions of dollars transacted in the banks and through the *hawalla* systems of money transfers to fund Al Qaeda operations would most likely have been detected.

Military action is one of the tools available to counterterrorism and is the most effective measure to physically eliminate terrorists, as witnessed in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where Al Qaeda structures were dismantled and many terrorists were killed or captured. However, those military actions were at times actually counterproductive. Far from serving as deterrents, such strikes served to further some of the political and organizational purposes of terrorist leaders; increase publicity for their cause; bolster their sense of importance; and reinforce the message that the United States is an evil enemy that knows only the language of force. In the final analysis, such strikes are almost always message-sending exercises rather than a means of significantly crippling terrorist capabilities.

Netanyahu believes the use of military action to defeat terrorists discourages dictators from undertaking terrorist campaigns against the West or its allies (Netanyahu 2001, 134). For example, the 1998 cruise-missile attacks in Sudan by the United States signaled to the government of Sudan that if it continued to sponsor terrorism the United States would not hesitate to attack the country. However, Netanyahu fails to address the second- and third-order effects of such actions, such as hardening the cause of the terrorists and the negative effects of using military strikes on an innocent populace to justify a cause. Conversely, Mark Juergensmeyer supports the hard-on-terrorism approach, suggesting that the use of violence to kill or forcibly control Bin Laden might deter persons from becoming involved in the planning of future terrorist acts (Juergensmeyer 2001, 229-31). On the other hand, the overt use of military force could elevate the possibility of more terrorist acts in retaliation. Recent experience shows that the best military action against the war on terrorism is the use of preemptive strikes as

opposed to retaliatory strikes, as happened in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Such counterterrorism measures will discourage more states from supporting terrorists groups.

Public diplomacy and information campaigns are key aspects of counterterrorism measures. Pillar examines the major fronts on which to fight terrorism, looking at the root causes and issues that give rise to terrorist groups. He examines what motivates individuals to join such groups and the ability of such groups to conduct terrorist attacks. According to him, any sound policy toward a terrorist group requires an understanding of what is and what is not important to that group, what drives its leaders and members, what stimulates it to attack, and what it would take to give up terrorism (Pillar 2001, 34). Governments should place increased emphasis on this area to counter terrorists' propaganda, demystify terrorism, and correct the misperception that governments are hostile to Islam, since most counterterrorism efforts are directed at the Muslim community. This campaign can be successful if it addresses the concerns of Islamic leaders and scholars.

Socioeconomic development is one area where the causes of terrorism can be mitigated. In considering socioeconomic development, especially when coupled with the diplomatic and informational tools of national power in combating terrorism, Lee Wee Ling emphasizes the importance of social economic development to mitigate the root causes of terrorism and the use of diplomacy and information campaigns with the objective of winning the hearts, minds, and souls of the international Muslim community through the promotion of the Islamic culture and teaching (Lee 2004, 66). Lee's arguments are supported by Campbell and Flournoy in their analysis of terrorism in

Africa. They cite marginalization and poverty among Muslims as factors that invite sectarian and inter-ethnic strife, despair, and anti-Western resentment (Campbell and Flournoy 2001, 255-56). In several parts of Africa, Muslim communities have embraced Islamic charitable organizations because those organizations provide social amenities such as schools, health centers, relief food, and the like. Terrorist groups intending to spread hatred and radicalism used some of these organizations as fronts for their actions. Therefore, an area of focus in the counterterrorism campaign should be to address the socioeconomic disparities terrorists groups exploit. Many developing countries do not have the enormous resources to address the problem, therefore, developed countries need to provide needed resources. Doing so might significantly reduce the number of Muslims being recruited to terrorist organizations.

Legislation is one of the means of effectively countering terrorism. In this area, Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison cite the benefit of legislation in the development of an effective counterterrorism strategy (Hoffman and Morrison 2000, 12-13).

Their sentiment is supported by Netanyahu who offers advice on fighting terrorism through revising legislation to enable greater surveillance and action against organizations inciting violence (Netanyahu 2001, 142). However, such legislation needs to consider the concerns of the infringement of civil liberties. Specialized judicial process and training of those involved in administering justice play key roles in counterterrorism strategy. Terrorists' acts mostly affect an innocent population, directly and indirectly, which calls for special training for those involved in fighting the crime. In this area, Jeremy Shapiro and Suzan Benedict advocate specialized training for law-enforcement officers engaged in terrorist investigations and prosecutions and for judges who hear

terrorist-related cases (Shapiro and Benedict 2003, 89). Shapiro and Benedict recommend establishing special courts in centralized locations to hear terrorist-related cases usually heard through the normal courts, where such cases frequently experience routine delays caused by judicial systems being grossly overburdened. As counterterrorism tools, these measures would allow effective investigation, prosecution, and conclusion of terrorist-related cases in a just and efficient manner.

Impact of Terrorism on Kenya

Despite Kenya being a victim of repeated terrorist attacks, not much literature is available covering the impact the threat has had on the country. Some literature relevant to this research highlights the socioeconomic impacts of the threat. In his article “Threat of Terrorism Hurts Kenya Tourism,” Marc Lecey says tourism, which is the driving force of Kenya’s economy, has been paralyzed because of travel bans imposed on the citizens of the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and other countries traveling to Kenya due to the fear of terrorist attacks (Lecey 2004). Likewise, in “US Policy Towards Kenya in the Wake of 11 September: Can Antiterrorist Imperatives be Reconciled with Enduring U.S. Foreign Policy Goals,” Joel Barkan and Jennifer Cooke cite the disruption of tea exports to Pakistan and Afghanistan as being caused by impending military strikes against Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (Barkan and Cooke 2001). Such bans and restrictions greatly affected Kenya’s economy, the decline of which resulted in many Kenyans, especially those along the coast, losing their jobs and, thus, aggravating the already widespread unemployment.

Summary

This chapter looked at some of the literature on terrorism. Figure 1 summarizes this discussion, covering the strategic and tactical levels of leadership; the psychological conditions that cause terrorism (economic imbalance, religious extremism, and repressive governments); and infrastructure that sustains terrorism, which are both external and internal support in the form of finance, intelligence, safe havens, and other logistical support. Finally, the literature reviewed covers counterterrorism measures and the impact of terrorism on Kenya. The various books and articles assessed in the course of this research form the basis of the research on the GoK's response based on the case studies.




Figure 1. Terrorist Organization Structure, Infrastructure, and Psychological Conditions

CHAPTER 3.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter outlines the research methodology used during the conduct of this research. The methodology used is qualitative case study with a trend analysis of the GoK's employment of the instruments of power after the two terrorist attacks. The trend analysis evaluates the effectiveness of the GoK's response to combat its transnational terrorism threat based on the trend growing out of the two case studies.

Methodology

The research methodology used in the case studies is the qualitative case study. The methodology emphasizes detailed conceptual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships in a given time period (Yin 1984, 23). The purpose of the case study in this thesis is to investigate the GoK's employment of the instruments of power to mitigate the transnational terrorism threat. The six steps of the case study that this research adopted involves determining and defining the research question; selecting the case studies and determining the relevant factors that are critical to fighting terrorism which are weighed against the most important elements and causes of terrorism; preparing and distributing questionnaire; collecting the questioner response; evaluating and analyzing the response and finally, determining the effectiveness of the GoK response to combat transnational terrorism threat.

The first part of this research methodology determines and defines the research question and gathers data from various sources. The literature is then analyzed to

ascertain the relevance of the information to the case studies. Ultimately, the literature and the analysis derived from the response to the questionnaire will be evaluated to provide recommendations on how the GoK may more effectively combat transnational terrorism within its borders.

Chapter 1 presented the background of the problem and defined some key terms that are frequently used in the paper and also defined the transnational terrorism threat in Kenya. This involved an assessment of why Kenya is a potential base and target of transnational terrorism and how terrorism impacts Kenya. Chapter 1 focused on a range of causes of transnational terrorism including Kenya's geopolitical situation, instability in neighboring countries, socioeconomic issues, and significant fundamental Islamic influences, all of which makes Kenya an attractive target for transnational terrorism. The assessment of the impact of terrorism focused on the socioeconomic impact of the threat.

The literature review in chapter 2 covered an assessment of the causes of terrorism and counterterrorism measures cited by the various authors. The chapter concluded with an examination of the impact of terrorism in Kenya that included socioeconomic issues, such as the loss of trade and revenue by the government and loss of jobs due to the collapse of the tourism industry.

The analysis of the GoK's response in combating transnational terrorism will be based on the two case studies. In addition, the research will assess the international community's support to Kenya in fighting terrorism. Finally, based on the analysis of the GoK's employment of both traditional and nontraditional instruments of power in fighting transnational terrorism, the factors that are critical to fighting terrorism will be weighed against the most important elements and causes of terrorism. The employment

of these instruments of power, against the most important factors that cause terrorism in Kenya, will be submitted in questionnaire format to eight experts who are privy to the GoK's policy to combat its transnational terrorism threat. (See Appendix A.) The response to the questioner will be used to validate the effectiveness of the government's response between and after the two major terrorist incidents--1998 to 2001 and 2002 to 2004. The questionnaire responses on the Kenyan government's effectiveness in applying the instruments of power will be assessed against each of the threat factors to produce a counterterrorism matrix (see table 1). Assessments for each of the cells in the counterterrorism matrix will be given a value of 0 to 5 (with 5 being the highest) based on the information obtained during the survey while analyzing the case studies. In evaluating the overall effectiveness of the governments' efforts to fighting transnational terrorism, an averaging of scores vertically in the cells in each time period in relation to questions in the appendix, as indicated in table 1, Counterterrorism Matrix Format, will be done. Finally, the subtotal of the averaged scores will be added horizontally to produce the perceived value of the overall learning curve in the period in between and after the two major terrorist incidents. Where the cells do not indicate a question number, it signifies that the variable being analyzed via that specific instrument of power would not be relevant.

The analysis eventually will provide insight into the level of the perceived learning curve the GoK demonstrated between the Embassy bombing in 1998 and the hotel bombings in 2002. Ultimately, the research is oriented toward answering the question of whether or not the Kenyan government's effort to fight terrorism is becoming more effective in reducing the transnational terrorism threat in the country. Finally,

chapter 5 will provide recommendations, based on the outcome of the matrix in chapter 4 on how to further improve the government's counterterrorism measures to mitigate the threat. In addition, it will provide conclusions and recommendations on areas for further research.

Table 1. Counterterrorism Matrix Format								
Factors contributing to terrorist attacks		Diplomacy	Information	Military	Socio-economics	Police-Intelligence	Legal-Financial Controls	Total
	Terrorist Cells	Q 1	Q 2 (a)	Q 3	X	Q 5 (a)	Q 6	
	Economic Imbalance	X	Q 2 (b)	X	Q 4	X	X	
	Religious Extremism	X	Q 2 (C)	X	X	Q 5 (b)	Q 6	
	Average							

Research Materials

The materials used for this research come from four types of sources. First, the research materials on Kenya's history and its ethnic composition are based on available authoritative sources and the author's personal experience. Second, research on terrorism, in general, is based on longstanding authoritative works of distinguished scholars on the subject. These sources provide an insight into definitions, general causes of terrorism, and the counterterrorism measures that have been applied in other countries. Third, as there are limited authoritative sources on the GoK's response based especially on the two case studies, the research also relies on information from individuals in the Kenyan Department of Defense and Kenya's counterterrorism center who provided valuable insight on the GoK's response to the threat of transnational terrorism. Fourth, with

limited authoritative work on terrorism in Kenya that is unclassified, the open-source materials used in this research come from books, newspaper articles, Internet articles, US government press releases, magazines, and research papers. Finally, given the current realities of limited authoritative works on terrorism in Kenya, this thesis aims to provide information useful for understanding transnational terrorist threats and proposes counterterrorism measures that can be applied to address the problem in Kenya.

In summary, this chapter looked at the research methodology used in this paper.

Figure 2 summarizes the research methodology, which involved the following:

1. Identification of the threat and factors relevant to the threat.
2. Identification of ways to address the factors of the threat.
3. Assessment of the effectiveness of the government's response to combat transnational terrorism in order to come up with strength or weakness of the strategy.
4. Development of recommendations to address the problem, if any.




Figure 2. Research Methodology

CHAPTER 4.

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The terrorist incidents in Kenya demonstrate clearly that terrorism is, and will remain, one of the main concerns for the Kenyan government in the foreseeable future. The Kenyan terrorist attacks conform to an emerging trend in international terrorism, striking far beyond terrorism's traditional operational theaters in Europe, the US, and the Middle East. Unlike many other countries around the world, until 1998, Kenya had not previously faced an external threat from terrorism. Consequently, the Kenyan government had no experience in fighting terrorism. Despite this inexperience, the Kenyan government has accepted the reality that terrorism has established roots in Kenya and has responded to combat the threat. This chapter analyzes the GoK's response to combat transnational terrorism based on two case studies. The chapter is divided into six sections:

1. Section one will present the first case study and analyze the GoK's response to the threat of transnational terrorism.
2. Section two will present the second case study and analyze the GoK's response to the terrorist incident.
3. Section three examines the improvement of the effectiveness of the GoK's response based on responses to a survey taken to determine if the GoK's better employment of the instruments of power to address the threat factors has had positive results.
4. Section four presents the effect of counterterrorism measures in Kenya.

5. Section five examines the critical aspect of regional cooperation to combat the challenges of transnational terrorism.

6. Section six addresses the international community's response in helping Kenya combat transnational terrorism.

Case Study 1

On 7 August 1998, at approximately 10:30 A.M., Kenya time, terrorists drove a truck loaded with a bomb into the rear parking area near the ramp to the basement garage of the US Embassy in Nairobi. The detonation killed 224 Kenyans and 12 Americans and injured more than 5,000 people who were in the vicinity. Most of the Kenyan casualties resulted when the adjacent Ufundi Building collapsed. Flying glass from the nearby Co-op Bank Building and debris from other buildings within a two to three-block radius injured pedestrians or motorists in the crowded streets next to the Embassy (US Department of Justice 1998). The terrorist incident was linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist group.

Background

Between 1993 and 1994, individuals associated with the Al Qaeda terrorist organization began to relocate to Kenya, primarily to the Nairobi and Mombasa areas (US Department of Justice 1998). One of the key players in the bombing, Mohammed Saddig Oden, was among those who arrived in Kenya in 1994 and settled in Mombasa. With the help of Al Qaeda funding, he established a fishing business for cover and funded Al Qaeda members in Kenya. While in Kenya, he had regular contact with Al Qaeda members in the country. Another key member, Harun Fazul, connected to the

1998 and 2002 bombings in Kenya, entered the country in 1996. He was engaged in the gem business with Wadih-el-Hage, a US citizen who was arrested in connection with the US Embassy bombing. Harun Fazul had helped Wadih-el-Hage obtain a Kenyan national identity card, and in 1997, Wadi-el-Hage was sent to Somalia to coordinate Al Qaeda operations. Wadi-el-Hage, who returned to Kenya to head the Al Qaeda cell, was later arrested and deported to the US for the role he played in the 1998 bomb attack. Harun Fazul, alias Abdulkarim, who was from the Comoros Islands, took over leadership of the cell (Mickolus and Simmons 2002, 140-43).

Abdulkarim, linked to the US Embassy bombing in Kenya, fled after the attack, then, disguised as an Islamic preacher, sneaked back into Kenya from Afghanistan sometime between 2001 and 2002. To remain undetected, he set up a base on Lamu Island on the coast and entrenched himself in the community, founding three football teams (Al Qaeda, Kandahar, and Kabul) for local youth (Mutinga 2004). He married a Kenyan woman a few months before the 2002 terrorist attacks of the Israeli-owned resort hotel and AIZ flight, going underground after the attacks. It is suspected he crossed the border into Somalia (Muiruri 2003 a).

Terrorists had been operating freely in Kenya, setting up various businesses, such as commercial fishing, clothing, and gem companies, while developing contacts for their deadly missions. To cover their intentions, most married Kenyan women. The networks resulting from marriages, common religion, culture, and finances have made recruiting Kenyans along the coast into their terrorist group a success. For example, nine Kenyans were implicated in the bombings of the US Embassy and the Israeli-owned resort hotel.

Among the nine, five were wanted for the 1998 Embassy bombing and the other four for the 2002 hotel and Israeli airline attacks (Special Report 2003).

Kenyans have facilitated intelligence and logistical support in the form of forged documents, marriages, and business contacts for the foreign terrorists. For example, a Kenyan helped deliver the truck loaded with explosives that detonated outside the US Embassy in Nairobi (Muiruri et al. 2002). Some terrorists were also associated with Kenyan-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) ostensibly created for the purposes of humanitarian relief and aid work. A chapter of Help African People, allegedly founded in Germany, was established in Nairobi by Wadi-El-Hage (US Department of Justice 1998). At one time, Help African People employed Harun Odeh, one of the masterminds of the 1998 US Embassy bombing.

Planning the Nairobi Attack

The initial planning of the attack against the US Embassy in Kenya took place in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin-Laden, was the architect of the plan. Before the attacks, Bin Laden had issued a *Fatwa*, calling for the killing of Americans. Among those who were to execute the attacks were Mohammed Al'Owhali, a Saudi national who joined Al Qaeda 18 months before the attacks, and Mohammed Saddig Oden, a Palestinian engineer who joined the network in 1994. Both underwent training in explosives, hijacking, and kidnapping in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Al'Owhali had attended meetings with Bin Laden at the end of 1996, but not until 1998 was he chosen for the fateful Nairobi bomb attack. He went to a training camp outside Kabul and received advanced lessons in bomb making, surveillance, and security. Al'Owhali was given a false Iraqi passport to facilitate his travel without raising suspicion. He went to

Yemen and stayed in San'a, the capital, with a comrade from the Taliban. On 18 May 1998, he flew back to Pakistan where he was briefed on his mission (Mickolus and Simmons 2002, 142-43). It is believed that the following individuals were also involved in the operation to bomb the US Embassy in Nairobi: Harun, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, alias Saleh; Odeh; Fahad Mohammed Ally; Abdul Rahman, alias Rahman; Mohammed Rashed Daoud Al'Owhali, alias Al'Owhali; and Jihad Mohammed Ali, alias Azzam (US Department of Justice 1998).

Final Preparation of the US Embassy Bombing in Kenya

Al'Owhali arrived in Nairobi on 2 August 1998; checked into a Ramada Hotel located in Eastleigh, an area inhabited by Somalis and Arabs; and received instructions to remain at the hotel. Later he was taken to a house on the edge of the city where he met one of his accomplices, Azzam, and other members of the operation. More details on the simultaneous attacks on the US Embassy in Kenya and Dar-es-salaam were discussed, and Al'Owhali was shown the Toyota truck he was to use for the bomb. On 4 August 1998, Al'Owhali and two other men drove to the US Embassy in Nairobi, where they made a video of the approaches and sketched a map of surrounding roads.

The bomb was assembled in two rooms in the Hill Top Hotel in Nairobi's central business district. The rooms had been rented by four of the bombers (two Palestinians, an Egyptian, and a Saudi Arabian) from 3 August to 7 August. Mohammed Saddig Howaida, the mastermind of the attacks, checked into the hotel on 4 August to join his accomplices. The bomb was assembled on 4, 5, and 6 August, and the bombers then took it to an enclosed truck outside the hotel for completion (Muiruri 1998).

Executing the US Embassy Bombing in Kenya

On 7 August, one of the four men accompanied two other suicide bombers to the US Embassy to launch the attack. Other men in hideouts in the city were monitoring their progress (Muiruri 1998). The plan was for the bomb to detonate in the underground parking area of the Embassy to achieve its maximum effect. At 10:30 A.M., at the rear entrance to the Embassy, Al'Owhali got out of the truck and walked toward the gate. His task was to ensure that if the dashboard detonator did not work for some reason, he could unlock the rear doors of the truck and throw in a grenade. But things did not go according to plan. When Al'Owhali reached for his pistol to force the guards to open the gate, he realized it was still in his jacket on the seat in the truck. Realizing it would take too long to retrieve the gun, he threw a grenade at the guards just as his accomplices detonated the bomb. Al'Owhali fled but was arrested later at the Ramada Hotel and handed over to the US to stand trial (Redfern 2001).

Analysis of the Kenyan Government's Response to Transnational Terrorism

Although the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Nairobi demonstrated the presence of terrorist groups in Kenya, there was not much of an effort by the government to counter the threat. The ease with which Al Qaeda members had operated in the country highlighted the weaknesses in the government's employment of instruments of power to effectively combat transnational terrorism. This chapter analyzes the GoK's counterterrorism measures before and after the US Embassy bombing, based on the case study. The traditional and nontraditional instruments of power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME) along with law-enforcement, legislation, and financial controls are used to analyze the GoK's response to the transnational terrorism threat.

Further, the effectiveness of the counterterrorism measures are assessed relative to the threat factors covered in chapter 1. Finally, the sociopolitical implications of the GoK's response regarding counterterrorism measures and the international community's response to help the GoK fight the threat are assessed.

Employment of the Instruments of Power

Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the instrument of power that builds political will and strengthens international cooperation. Diplomatic exchanges promote counterterrorism cooperation with friendly nations that serve each other's mutual interests. Transnational terrorism has no boundaries and requires governments to reach out to their neighbors and allies to forge a multilateral approach in the fight against the threat. Diplomacy supports the other instruments of national power in numerous ways. For example, extradition treaties help in the application of criminal law by facilitating the transfer of fugitive terrorist suspects. Intelligence sharing among nations potentially discourages terrorists from operating in those countries and facilitates the monitoring of groups operating in the region. After the 1998 US Embassy bombing, the GoK fully cooperated with the US government in intelligence sharing and in giving US investigators access to investigate the incident. The government also helped apprehend and hand over the suspects to US investigators to stand trial in the United States. Apart from the United States, the GoK approached the Israeli government to obtain its assistance in rescue operations. This was followed by the dispatch of rescue teams and intelligence agencies to help track those responsible for the attacks.

In the East African region, Kenya took center stage internationally because of what was perceived as the terrorists' change in operations to focus on soft targets in countries where the phenomenon of terrorism had not yet been experienced. The GoK allowed the United States to use Kenya for logistical support as it investigated the terrorist incident, which resulted from the perceived notion that Kenya was a victim of terrorism because of US interests in the country, and that the United States had to play a major role in investigating the attacks. However, the GoK did not apply much effort to incorporating the countries in the Horn of Africa region in a unified regional counterterrorism strategy because of the belief that Kenya was a victim rather than a source of international terrorism. This denial was tied to the inability to acknowledge the wider context that led to the growth of terrorism--the erosion of the structure of governance, notably weak intelligence capabilities and law enforcement (Khadiagala 2004, 2). Furthermore, the government was afraid to alienate Kenya's Muslims who often complained of perceived marginalization. It was feared this group would bear the brunt of any counterterrorism efforts, since most of the terrorist suspects were from the Muslim community.

The government was in a precarious position from the fears that there could be political risks if it engaged in a full-scale counterterrorism campaign. Within Kenya, several groups, some of which already felt marginalized and aggrieved by the former Kenyatta and Moi regimes, were reluctant to accept open-ended military and law-enforcement cooperation with the US. These groups openly urged the government to deny the use of Kenyan bases to the US government (Barkan and Cooke 2001). In Mombasa and other coastal towns, where the population is largely Muslim, there were

protests against American FBI agents sent to hunt down suspected terrorists. There was also the feeling that full cooperation with the United States in the counterterrorism campaign might lead to the country being targeted again. Effective counterterrorism measures could potentially have destabilized the country. Despite evidence of the presence of terrorist cells and the involvement of Kenyans in terrorist activities, the hostility toward the government's counterterrorism measures and diplomatic cooperation with the United States still exists. For example, in early 2004, Muslims leaders asked the government to expel the FBI from the country to allow Kenya to conduct its own investigations of terrorist activities in the country (Packard 2004).

The Muslims' concerns might be justifiable since they bear the brunt of counterterrorism measures. However, Muslim leaders are using counterterrorism measures as a veil. The real issue is that the communities depended on Islamic organizations for social welfare (medical, food relief, and Islamic education) and socioeconomic support to marginalized communities, which the GoK is either incapable of or unwilling to give. There were also several Islamic institutions that were being sponsored by individuals and other Arab Muslim countries. As a result of the terrorist incident, there was focus on these Muslim NGOs. While some, such as Al Haramain, were deregistered by the government, others closed after sponsoring nations stopped funding them when the US launched the GWOT. Many communities, including teachers and some Muslim clerics who worked for these organizations, were left without any other support, and the government did not come in to fill the gap. This denial of support contributes to the dissent.

Military

After the 1998 terrorists attack, the military, as an instrument of power, was not effectively used to combat terrorism, partly because of the notion that terrorists activities were minimal at the time, that the initial incident was more of a criminal act than a terrorist act, and that it was an isolated incident. The reality that terrorists were using the porous land borders and coastline to enter the country had not dawned on the government. Also, the role of maintaining law and order had traditionally rested with the police in Kenya. Unlike today, the military had no training to combat terrorism. These factors might have caused the government not to employ the military for counterterrorism efforts after the 1998 bombing. Nevertheless, the military increased surveillance along the Kenya-Somalia border. Military intelligence also joined other intelligence communities in the country to assess the threat.

Information

An information campaign is critical to any counterterrorism strategy. When well employed, it can counter perceived marginalization among some communities by educating the populace about the government's plans to address the problem. After 1998, the government was in a state of denial and did not conduct a full-fledged information campaign to educate the public on the need to cooperate and expose terrorists within their midst. Terrorists do not operate in a vacuum; they are part and parcel of the community. A well-employed and effective information campaign could have helped mold the public's attitude and to expose foreigners. One can argue that there was a limited information campaign; however, this was limited to urban areas. In rural areas, especially in coastal and northeastern regions where many communities have no access to print or

electronic media and where terrorists, disguising themselves as Islamic preachers, businessmen, and teachers, can blend easily into the community, an effective information campaign would have helped expose them. The lack of resources and the perception that the country was a victim, rather than a source of terrorism, can also be attributed to the failure to launch an effective information campaign.

Intelligence and Law Enforcement

Intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies are important in an effective counterterrorism strategy. The key to winning the battle against terrorism is winning the intelligence battle. Intelligence enables early detection of terrorists in time for law-enforcement officers or the military to act. However, for it to be of any value, intelligence must be supported by effective law enforcement in conducting apprehensions and disruptions of terrorist cells. Before 1998, there was a failure on the part of intelligence and law-enforcement agencies to detect domestic and foreign terrorists freely operating within the country. The ease with which these terrorists were entering and leaving the country before the attacks raises questions about the ability and efficiency of intelligence activities and law enforcement at the time. For example, effective intelligence and law enforcement should have detected the terrorists when they were assembling the bomb in the truck at the busy river-road streets in Nairobi, an area often filled with police.

While intelligence agencies and police failed to prevent the attack or dismantle Al Qaeda cells in the initial stages, there are other agencies that contributed to the failures. The fight against terrorism is not a police battle alone; it also involves the Immigration Department. Most of the terrorist suspects were foreigners. Some of the foreigners living in Kenya had fake documents, including Kenyan national identity cards and passports.

Because of institutional corruption during the former regime, a person could easily obtain Kenyan national identity cards, passports, birth certificates, or other documents through Kenya's black market. Terrorists can exploit such loopholes to enter the country disguised as immigrants, tourists, or businessmen. Because of the Immigration Department's laxity, a large percentage of Pakistani and other immigrants reside in Kenya. Some of these foreigners are engaged in microeconomic activities.

Another area the terrorists exploited was the lack of security awareness at the country's entry points. The ease with which Mohammed Saddig, a terrorist who was traveling on a fake passport, left Nairobi via the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on 6 August 1998 (later arrested at Karachi airport in Pakistan), is evidence of inefficiency on the part of the Immigration Department. Corruption within the Kenyan police force in the 1990s was rampant; failure of effective law enforcement also contributed to the problem. The police force was so ill-equipped it could not respond to emergencies because of a basic lack of transportation and communication resources.

Despite the shortcomings noted, after the 1998 terrorist attack, law-enforcement officials arrested several terrorist suspects a few days after the attacks. These suspects were handed over to the US government to stand trial. While it can be argued that the FBI helped in the arrests, the GoK continued to track the terrorists and their supporters in the country after the FBI concluded its preliminary investigations. For example, in November 2001, the GoK arrested more than twenty people in Lamu who were suspected of having links with Al Qaeda along the Kenyan coast (Khadiagala 2004, 3). Although intelligence and law-enforcement agencies continued to track terrorist suspects and their supporters in the country, it is evident there was a missing link, either an effective approach was not

applied or initial successes were the result of external pressure. The lack of effective intelligence and law enforcement contributed to the failure to deter the 2002 terrorist attacks.

Legislation

Although transnational terrorism had started to establish roots in Kenya, the government made no progress in implementing appropriate domestic legislation on terrorism-related issues. Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003, similar to the US Patriot Act, met with stiff opposition from individuals, human-rights organizations, Muslim organizations, and some parliamentarians who feared it would infringe on basic human rights and target specific communities, especially the Muslim community. To address this suspicion, the government is redrafting a bill to incorporate concerns from civic leaders and human rights organizations. Nevertheless, despite the lack of counterterrorism legislation, the government has been able to prosecute those arrested for terrorist activities using the general criminal law. Other countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Israel have used general criminal courts to prosecute terrorist-related cases. However, they have also enacted a variety of special laws relating to terrorism. For example, under French law, certain criminal offenses are considered terrorism when the acts are intentionally linked to an individual or group whose purpose is to cause a serious disruption of public order through intimidation or terror (Rabkin 2000, 9-10). Counterterrorism legislation is an important instrument of an effective counterterrorism strategy, and any government confronted with the threat of terrorism should enact such legislation. The enactment of such laws expresses the government's political will to combat the threat.

Financial Controls

Money has often been described as a key to international terrorism, thus tracking it is a key to counterterrorism. As an instrument of power, the government has not enacted any legislation on financial controls. However, it has established a task force on anti-money laundering and on the financing of terrorism (Khadiagala 2004, 4). The task force's intent is to review existing legislation and come up with a draft of a national policy on combating the financing of terrorism. It is also working closely with the US Interagency Terrorist Finance Working Group to develop a comprehensive antimoney laundering and counterterrorist finance program (Royce 2004). In addition, administrative measures have been put in place by the Central Bank of Kenya to deal with identifying, tracing, and freezing financial assets belonging to persons identified with terrorist activities (Greenstock 2002). The lack of such legislation has made Kenya one of the countries where money laundering is on the rise, and the possibility of terrorists exploiting this weakness cannot be ruled out. The problem is further aggravated by the numerous *hawalla* systems of money transfer operating in the country. The *hawalla* traditional system of money transfer is based on mutual trust and sometimes transactions are made by a phone call leaving no paper trails. For example, you deposit money in the United States then instruct the agents in the beneficiary country to issue the money to the beneficiary. A key component of antiterrorism strategy should be starving terrorists of the resources they need to operate. As a sign of commitment to fighting terrorism, financial controls should be enacted. Equally, all the *hawallas* operating in the country should be registered with the Central Bank for close monitoring. Regular checks of their operations would deter them from being used to remit terrorist finances.

Case Study 2

On 28 November 2002, at 8:30 A.M., suicide bombers detonated a truckload of explosives at an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa, Kenya, killing 16 people (12 Kenyans and 4 Israelis) and injuring more than 80 others. Three suicide bombers also perished in the attack. The attack came moments after a group of Israeli tourists had just checked into the hotel. Many of the dead were Kenyan dancers who were hired to entertain tourists. This bombing incident was coordinated with a simultaneous surface-to-air missile attack on Arkia Israeli airliner (AIZ), carrying about 264 passengers, taking off from the Mombasa airport. The two missiles missed the airliner. The attack was linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist organization.

Background

The terrorist attacks at the hotel and against the AIZ flight were directly linked to Al Qaeda. It was established that the terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network were actively involved in terrorist missions in Kenya and continued to operate as they did before the US Embassy bombing in 1998. Further investigations revealed that only one Al Qaeda terrorist cell was active in Kenya--the one led by Odeh's accomplice, Wadih El-Hage (Muiruri 2003 b).

Planning the Mombasa Attacks

After the 1998 US Embassy bombing, most of the terrorists involved evaded arrests. Some slipped out of the country to Somalia and Afghanistan to allow the dust to settle; others blended into the community. The leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist cell in Kenya, a Comoran national named Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, alias Harun Fazul

Abdulkarim, who had been involved in the 1998 US Embassy bombing, sneaked back into Kenya sometime between 2001 and 2002 from Afghanistan. He set up base in Lamu under the alias Abdulkarim, where he continued to plot attacks against Western interests. He entrenched himself in the community by marrying a Kenyan Woman (Muiruri 2003). While in the country, he kept contact with his Kenyan accomplices in selecting targets. The Al Qaeda terrorist cell consisted of nine active Kenyans among other foreigners. Three Kenyans were directly involved in the Mombasa attacks. The hotel was selected because it was owned by an Israeli and frequented by Israeli nationals. The selection was further made possible by the routine Israeli tourists flights to Mombasa. Planning attacks for such a soft target assured the terrorists minimum risks, since only basic surveillance was needed to coordinate the attack.

Executing the Mombasa Attacks

The terrorists organized themselves into two groups. One group was to detonate the truck bomb inside the Paradise Hotel near Mombasa; the other group was to shoot down the Israeli airliner as it took off from the airport. On 28 November 2002, there was a routine Israeli tourist flight to Mombasa. Traditionally, the flight brings in one group of tourists and returns with others. At 8:30 A.M., three suicide bombers drove to Kikambala on the North Coast to the Paradise Hotel, which was packed with newly arrived guests from Israel. The terrorists rammed their four-wheel-drive vehicle (Pajero) through a security barrier at the hotel and crashed their car into the reception desk, detonating the vehicle's load of explosives. Simultaneously, two missiles were fired at the Israeli charter plane carrying 264 passengers at Mombasa's Moi International Airport. The missile attack failed when the surface-to-air missiles missed their target (Muiruri et al. 2002).

Government Response

Kenya, with its poor security checks at the airport at the time and its porous borders, had become a soft target for terrorists who found it increasingly difficult to attack Western countries because of their strict counterterrorism measures. A few days before the Mombasa terrorist attacks, Australia and Britain had issued travel advisories for their citizens not to visit Kenya, especially Mombasa, because of imminent terrorist attacks. Those countries had received intelligence that an active terrorist cell in Kenya was plotting to attack Western interests. Osama bin-Laden also had warned of an attack in his broadcast on Qatar television news in Al Jazeera.

After these attacks, the government realized that burying its head in the sand and wishing the problem away would not help. It confronted the problem and publicly declared that transnational terrorism had taken roots in Kenya. To counter the threat, the GoK embarked on a multifaceted counterterrorism strategy and employed diplomacy, military, information, financial controls, intelligence, and law-enforcement instruments of power to respond to the threat.

Diplomacy

On the diplomatic front, the government invited the Israeli government to help investigate the incident, which led to the arrival of Israeli Mossad agents at Mombasa a few hours after the incident to team up with Kenyan counterterrorism experts. The government also enlisted the support of US and other European governments to help fight the threat. Transnational terrorism has no borders, and there was overwhelming evidence that the terrorists had been operating in the Horn of Africa region. The presence of the threat and the need to secure the borders pressed the government to enlist the support of

other countries in the region, through the East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) (established after the 11 September 2001), which coordinates counterterrorism capabilities in the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, to improve police and judicial counterterrorist capabilities in the region (US Department of State 2004).

This cooperation has realized intelligence sharing among nations in the region for the purpose of law enforcement to combat the transnational threat of terrorism. Kenya has shown further diplomatic efforts by ratifying the twelve international UN counterterrorism conventions and protocols, which shows the government is taking the transnational terrorism threat seriously and does not intend to be left behind.

Kenya also joined the US in the GWOT, playing a pivotal role in the Horn of Africa region by allowing the United States to use Kenya as a launching pad for counterterrorism efforts in the region. By being a member of the willing nations, the country has benefited from intelligence sharing. In an effort to bring peace to the region and to reduce conditions for terrorist breeding grounds in the surrounding failed and failing states, Kenya is deeply involved in both Somalia and Sudan Peace Processes, which are within the Intergovernmental Authority and Development framework, to achieve stability and functioning institutions in these countries. Stability in these countries will reduce their use as potential safe havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists.

The longstanding mistrust among the countries in the region, however, could easily hinder intelligence sharing. For example, it is Ethiopia's perception that Kenya supports the Oromo Liberation Front that fights the Ethiopian government, which has

resulted in constant border skirmishes and international border violations by Ethiopian security forces into Kenya. Recently, eight Ethiopian soldiers serving along the volatile Eritrean-Ethiopian border fled into Kenya seeking political asylum, which further soured the relationship (Kwamboka 2004). The government is maintaining high-level contact to alleviate the mistrust. US assistance to the countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa region also is a cause of complaints from countries in the region. For example, Uganda claims it is being shortchanged in financial assistance because it has dealt successfully with the international terrorist threat on its own. However, Uganda's priority is dealing with local terrorists groups, such as the Lords Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Front, while US financial assistance focuses on international terrorists, such as Al Qaeda. In addition, Eritrea offered the US access to its port facilities and joined the coalition of the willing against Iraq. However, it finds itself frozen out of counterterrorism assistance because of human rights issues (Shinn 2004, 7). This complaint might hinder intelligence sharing in the region because most of the countries have joined the coalition of the willing nations through a desire to gain financial favours from the United States.

The present threat calls for countries in the region to cultivate good will and mutual trust in order to have a common goal of fighting transnational terrorism. Their cooperation would facilitate intelligence sharing and joint security operations to combat the threat. These should, in the long run, lead to the good intentions behind the establishment of the EACTI. When evaluating the effectiveness of the employment of this instrument of power based on the response to the survey to be discussed later, the

government scored 2.75 points as compared to the application of the same instrument between 1998 and 2001 when the government scored 2.25 points (see tables 2 and 3).

Military

To protect its borders as a result of the increased terrorist threat after the 2002 terrorist attacks, the government increased security along the Kenya-Somalia border, which precipitated the sealing of all the borders. In a multilateral approach to combating transnational terrorism, the Kenyan and French navies collaborated in the Indian Ocean by patrolling to keep terrorists away (Ringa 2004, 6). These measures are intended to tighten border controls and prevent the entry of terrorists through the long, porous Kenyan coastline. However, the lack of a stable government in Somalia has made it difficult to coordinate and monitor border security.

To benefit from intelligence sharing and resources to combat the threat, Kenya has offered total support to the US government in the war on transnational terrorism. Consequently, Kenya is represented in the US Counterterrorism Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti and has officers in Tampa, Florida, for counterterrorism coordination for the Horn of Africa. This program utilizes US training of regional militaries in counterterrorism procedures, with its stated mission to detect, disrupt, and defeat transnational terrorism (Fisher-Thompson 2004). This training has enhanced Kenya's military preparedness. However, the military lacks efficient, effective transportation and communication equipment to effectively carry out these new tasks. Resources are needed to equip the force to enable it to effectively assert its presence along the porous land borders to deter entry of terrorists into the country. In the

assessment of effective employment of this instrument of power, the government scored 2.5 points as compared to the period between 1998 and 2001 when it scored 1 point.

Information

Since the 2002 terrorist attacks, the Kenyan government has been more outspoken on the domestic nature of Kenya's terrorist threat although it had earlier downplayed the threat. For the first time, the minister in charge of internal security and provincial administration, Chris Murungaru, publicly acknowledged the presence of terrorists in the country. Though hampered by a lack of resources, the government started a limited information campaign through the Provincial Administration and the Ministry of Education to enlist the support of its citizens in the fight against terrorism, a mission accomplished by sensitizing the civil society on counterterrorism measures (Government of Kenya 2004, 7). The information campaign is aimed at demystifying terrorism and correcting the misconception that the war on terrorism is a war against Muslims.

However, there is skepticism and mistrust about the government's sincerity in the counterterrorism campaign because the Muslim community's perception is that the war on terrorism specifically targets its community. It is also believed counterterrorism measures are being forced onto the government by the United States. As earlier stated, a well-coordinated information campaign would correct this mistrust and, thus, the public could play a greater role in counterterrorism measures by exposing local and foreign terrorists in their midst. In the analysis of the effective employment of this instrument to address the threat factors (terrorist cells, economic imbalance, and religious extremism), the government scored an average of 2.08 points as compared to the period between 1998 and 2001, when it scored 1.58 points.

Intelligence and Law Enforcement

After the 2002 terrorist attacks, the government increased the employment of the intelligence and law-enforcement instruments of power to fight the threat. It released detailed counterterrorism measures and resourced the police with vehicles and other equipment. To improve efficiency in the police, an army officer (a brigadier general) was appointed as the police commissioner for the first time in Kenyan history. This was followed by drastic changes in the police force, which led to many officers being forced to retire. These measures improved the efficiency of the police in combating terrorism as well as ordinary crimes.

Effective law enforcement and increased intelligence gathering led to the disruption of terrorist cells in the country. These operations were multifaceted and incorporated the FBI and the Israeli Mosad in investigations and intelligence gathering. Some of the police's achievements that continue to deter terrorism include the arrest in August 2003 of terrorist suspects who were planning new terrorist attacks aimed at US, British, and Israeli diplomatic missions and tourists centers and airlines in Kenya. In other actions, the police seized an arms cache that included five shoulder-launch missiles, a hand grenade, and ammunition for AK-47 assault rifles in Mombasa (Nation Reporter.2003). They also arrested four terrorists who participated directly in the 2002 attacks and three Kenyans who went on trial on 7 January 2004, charged with conspiring to carry out several terrorist attacks in Kenya, including plotting the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi and the Mombasa attacks (Mombasa Attack Trial Starts. 2004). Finally, in January 2005, the police arrested a Yemeni terrorist suspect at Likoni, South Coast, in Mombasa (Oketch 2005). These actions, though prompted by the discovery that

the Kenyan Al Qaeda cell leader mentioned earlier had slipped back into Kenya, clearly demonstrate the effective use of intelligence and law enforcement in the counterterrorism campaign. The success has served as deterrence to terrorists who intend to use Kenya as an operational base. Future effectiveness, however, depends greatly on whether law enforcement and intelligence will continue being used effectively.

To dedicate resources in combating transnational terrorism, the government established an antiterrorism police unit on 10 February 2003, with the mandate to plan and execute antiterrorism activities. This creation resulted in the establishment of regional branches in Nairobi, Mombasa (Coast Province), and Garissa (Northeastern Province), which are strategically located to serve the areas where transnational terrorism has sympathizers. The government is also at an advanced stage of establishing other regional units in Eldoret in the west, Lokichogio in the northwest, and in Kisumu on Lake Victoria to police the airport, the Kenya-Uganda-Sudan borders, and the Lake Victoria region (Government of Kenya 2004, 7-8). These units are engaged in monitoring terrorist-related activities with the aim of early detection and apprehension.

The availability of both hard and soft targets attracts terrorists to Kenya. To protect vulnerable targets, the government has formed tourist and diplomatic police forces responsible for ensuring the safety of tourists in the parks and at tourists' hotels. However, because of scarce resources and a lack of manpower, the police cannot always provide adequate security. To tighten the borders, the government is reviving the marine police unit to patrol Kenya's territorial waters. The government is also in the process of reorganizing the Department of Public Prosecutions to establish an Anti-Terrorism Prosecution Unit that would deal exclusively with counterterrorism prosecutions

(Government of Kenya 2004, 8). This unit will work closely with the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit to ensure the successful prosecution of terrorism suspects. To prepare the security agents and other agencies involved in the counterterrorism campaign, the government has trained personnel from the military, regular police, immigration, and national security intelligence services, Kenya Ports Authority, Ministry of Tourism and Information, and other departments in counterterrorism measures. In the foreseeable future, these measures will improve the capability of security forces and other sectors involved in counterterrorism efforts.

Despite law-enforcement and intelligence successes, corruption in the Immigration Department and the Registrar of Persons has made it easy for aliens to acquire Kenyan passports and identity cards. To address the problem, the government has undertaken drastic measures to curb corruption. These measures should guard against illegal entry and residency of aliens and other undesirable immigrants. Future success depends on the governments' commitments to eradicate corruption. Another area the government has focused on is guarding airports and seaports against the illegal entry of undesirable material or personnel. However, success in this area depends on a change in attitude in order to inculcate a sense of security consciousness, along with the government's commitment to continue with the war on corruption at the ports. When evaluating the effective employment of these instruments in addressing terrorist cells and religious extremism, the government scored an average of 3.13 points as compared to the same factors between 1998 and 2001 when it scored 2.25 points.

Financial Controls

Kenya is among the countries where money laundering, linked to terrorism, thrives because of the lack of a legal system to deal with criminals perpetrating the crime. Inadequate legislation has made Kenya ripe for money laundering and easy exploitation by terrorists. The existence of the *hawala* system of money transfer makes it difficult to fight money laundering because the system does not leave paper trails (Wako 2004). To address the crime, the Kenyan cabinet approved the Crime and Money Laundering (prevention) Bill of 2004, which enables law-enforcement officials to identify, trace, and freeze proceeds from crimes and requires financial institutions and designated nonfinancial institutions to take prudent measures to help fight money laundering (Mutua 2005). In the long run, these measures will deprive terrorists of the needed cash for recruiting and conducting operations in Kenya. The survey to determine the effectiveness of the application of this instrument shows that the government scored 1.5 points after the 2002 terrorist attacks. However, when averaged with legislation in addressing religious extremist groups it reflected a score of .75 points (see table 3).

Interagency and International Cooperation

Pulling centralized and synchronized intelligence from all sources into a joint operational plan to fight terrorism is essential in winning the war on terrorism. After the 2002 terrorist attacks, the GoK established a National Counterterrorism Center responsible for developing and coordinating counterterrorism strategies (Mbogo 2004). In addition to developing a sustainable counterterrorism strategy, the center investigates money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of illicit arms. It also promotes intelligence sharing to fight the threat in the Horn of Africa region. Establishing

the center has ensured timely dissemination of intelligence to tactical units charged with combating terrorism and demonstrates that Kenya is taking the right step in its counterterrorism campaign. The success of the government's efforts to reduce future terrorist attacks depends on effective employment of the instruments of power, which must be supported by political and popular will. The government needs to enact more comprehensive antiterrorist and financial control legislations.

Implication of the Counterterrorism Efforts in Kenya

After the 2002 terrorist attacks, the Kenyan government undertook bold counterterrorism measures at the expense of potential dissent among radical elements of Kenya's Muslim population. The perception that such efforts target the Muslim community has created opposition to the proposed counterterrorism legislation and spawned challenges on civil liberties. For example, the intelligence and law-enforcement communities' increased surveillance of suspected individuals has caused conflict between the need to combat transnational terrorism while safeguarding personal liberties.

By focusing on front organizations and terrorist financing, some genuine and some suspect NGOs that played a critical role in humanitarian activities have been deregistered by the government. After the 1998 terrorists attack, for example, the GoK deregistered such Muslim NGOs as Al Haramain (due to its involvement in terrorist funding), which provided social support mostly to Muslim communities in the northeastern part of the country. The populations that these organizations supported were rendered destitute. Such measures have elicited a tremendous outcry and could very well translate into further hatred unless the government fills the gap. Such dissent also provides a ripe target for terrorist recruitment. The presence and the assistance in terms of

intelligence and resources by the US government to Kenya have also created the perception that the US is directly involved in arrests and investigations of terrorism-related incidences. It is the perception that counterterrorism measures are meant to gratify Kenya's allies, without taking stock as to why Kenyans are sympathetic to the terrorists. The government must take drastic measures to correct this misconception.

Effectiveness of the Government Counterterrorism Measures

The government employed the instruments of power to fight the transnational terrorism threat by addressing the relevant factors that cause terrorism in the country. In evaluating the response of the Kenyan government, the focus was on assessing the government's use of the instruments of power against the relevant factors (the presence of established terrorist cells, perceived socioeconomic marginalization, and religious extremism) that cause terrorism in Kenya.

The Kenyan government's effectiveness in applying the instruments of power was assessed against each of these factors to produce a counterterrorism matrix (see tables 2 and 3). Assessments for each of the cells in the matrix were given a value of 0 to 5 (with 5 being the highest) based on the information obtained during the survey while building the case studies. To determine overall effectiveness of the governments' efforts, an averaging of scores vertically in the cells in each period was done. Finally, the subtotal of the averaged scores were added horizontally to produce the perceived value of the overall learning curve in the period in between and after the two major terrorist incidents (see tables 2 and 3). An analysis of these counterterrorism measures resulted in an assessment that the government was moderately effective in employing the instruments of power

between 1998 and 2001. However, after the 2002 terrorist attacks, the government more effectively applied the instruments of power to mitigate the threat.

The analysis reflects that the government scored least well in addressing economic imbalance for the two periods. It also shows that the government did not use the instruments of legislation and financial controls after the 1998 attack; however, after the 2002 attacks the government embarked on policies to address financial controls, among them being the approval of the Crime and Money Laundering (prevention) Bill of 2004. However, no antiterrorist legislation was enacted.

The military, as an instrument of power, was not effectively employed because the counterterrorism role was considered as secondary to the military role in Kenya. Overall, the analysis of the government's counterterrorism measures based on the survey realized a dramatic improvement on the effectiveness of the GoK employment of the instruments of power to mitigate the threat. The improvement of the trend realized a score of 13.46 points after 2002 as compared with a score of 8.58 points after the 1998 attack (see tables 2 and 3).

The Kenyan government needs to put more efforts in the overall employment of the instruments of power to improve on the measures in fighting the transnational terrorism threat in the country. To reduce the risks for future terrorist attacks, the government needs to seriously address the elements of the threat factors in order to deter any future attacks. In the fight against terrorism in Kenya, qualitative improvement is what is needed as opposed to quantitative. The government should therefore show political will by enacting antiterrorist legislation and focus on allocating adequate

resources to the following instruments of power to mitigate the threat: information; law enforcement and intelligence; and socioeconomic development.

Table 2. Counterterrorism Matrix Depicting Instruments of Power, 1998-2001								
Factors contributing to terrorist attacks		Diplomacy	Information	Military	Socio-economics	Police-Intelligence	Legal-Financial Controls	Total
	Terrorist Cells	2.25	1.5	1	X	2.25	0	
	Economic Imbalance	X	1.5	X	1.5	X	X	
	Religious Extremism	X	1.75	X	X	2.25	0	
	Average	2.25	1.58	1	1.5	2.25	0	8.58

Table 3. Counterterrorism Matrix Depicting Instruments of Power, 2002-2004								
Factors contributing to terrorist attacks		Diplomacy	Information	Military	Socio-economics	Police-Intelligence	Legal-Financial Controls	Total
	Terrorist Cells	2.75	2	2.5	X	3	1.5	
	Economic Imbalance	X	2	X	2.25	X	X	
	Religious Extremism	X	2.25	X	X	3.25	0	
	Average	2.75	2.08	2.5	2.25	3.13	.75	13.46

Regional Efforts to Combat Transnational Terrorism

The Kenyan government's efforts to fight transnational terrorism alone cannot yield significant results without the cooperation of the countries in the region. The existence of long, porous borders that transnational terrorist can exploit has forced Kenya to forge a multilateral approach to the fight against terrorism. The GoK has fully engaged in diplomacy with the countries in the region and is a key player in EACTI. For broad

intelligence sharing in the fight against terrorism, Kenya hosted an Africa regional counterterrorism conference in August 2004 to discuss regional cooperation in fighting the threat. This cooperation would, in the long run, help enforce border control and intelligence sharing.

Somalia's instability has also created problems for enforcing border controls. Somalia's lack of a central government for the last 14 years and its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula make it a potential location for international terrorists seeking transit or a launching point from which to conduct operations elsewhere. Somalia also widely uses the *hawalla* system of money transfer. The lawlessness in Somalia is conducive to the unhindered or unchecked movement of terrorists, materiel, and cash between the two countries through the long, unpatrolled coastline and porous borders. To address the problem, Kenya has been on the forefront in the region in bringing about national reconciliation to establish peace and stability in Somalia.

The peace process in Kenya realized the signing of a peace accord between the warlords and the formation of a transitional federal government in Somalia. However, because of insecurity, the new government has not relocated to Somalia. This problem was further complicated by the failure to agree on the composition of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping force, which has made the new government's relocation questionable because of many Somalis, warlords, parliamentarians, and militant groups keeping the AU peacekeeping force out of frontline states. This issue has divided the Somalis, and the future of the peace process hinges on reaching a consensus on the issue. The frontline states (Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti) should abandon their parochial interest and support the Somalis' wishes.

The AU and Western and European governments should seize this opportunity to support the new Somalia government to bring in peacekeepers to establish authority, disarm the militias, and pacify the country. Given the current good will within the Somali community and the involvement of all the warlords in the new government, the possibility that peace will be attained is a reality. With the establishment of a stable government in Somalia, Kenya and its allies would have an additional partner to fight terrorism in the region and to mitigate the use of the porous borders between Kenya and Somali by Al Qaeda elements.

International Community Response

Transnational terrorism affects global peace and stability. As such, no country can single-handedly combat the threat. The enormous resources and global intelligence needed are beyond the reach of many developing countries. For several decades, security cooperation has been an important aspect of Kenya-US relations, despite political disagreements between the US and the former Moi regime because of corruption and human rights abuses. The relations with the government of the popularly elected leader, President Mwai Kibaki, are warmer and promise deeper security cooperation, which led to the United States spending over \$3.1 million on antiterrorist assistance, including training Kenyan security personnel in the United States (Khadiagala 2004, 4). These programs have been complemented by other initiatives, such as the US donation of \$1 million in airport security equipment under the “Safe Skies Africa” program to improve aviation security.

The terrorist interdiction programs hardware and software package is intended to significantly reduce terrorists’ freedom of movement among countries by the use of a

state-of-the-art computer network that enables immigration and border control officials to quickly identify suspicious persons on terrorist watch lists who might be attempting to enter or leave the country (Royce 2004). There is also increased terrorist-related intelligence sharing, which has enabled the government to apprehend and disrupt the activities of terrorist suspects. The response of the international community, especially in providing the enormous resource and intelligence sharing will help Kenya fight transnational terrorism.

Current US policies are, as are those of other European countries, geared to meet the challenges of a soft target, as Kenya is perceived to be. However, Kenya is a source of terrorism as well as a soft target. The components of the US counterterrorism program to Kenya are good, but the focus is primarily short and medium term, such as apprehending terrorists, providing training, and building a counterterrorism infrastructure to deny terrorists opportunities to exploit institutional weaknesses. What is missing is a long-term program to reduce poverty and the socioeconomic imbalance terrorists exploit.

Dealing with the source of terrorism entails institutional changes that go far beyond protection. These involve commitments of enormous resources to address the socioeconomic conditions that promote terrorism in Kenya. Apart from security assistance, the United States should vigorously implement its National Security Strategy 2002, goal of diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, such as poverty, deprivation, social disenfranchisement, and unresolved political and regional disputes (Bush 2002, 17-19). Efforts to diminish these underlying conditions have material as well as intangible dimensions.

While the United States has, of late, been greatly involved in efforts to resolve regional disputes, such as the protracted Sudanese civil war and the Somali peace process, it needs to focus more on the war of ideas in trying to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world. It should also help developing countries in free-trade incentives, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act, to provide access to US markets for agricultural and industrial goods. This initiative would help poor countries foster sustainable economies, which would reduce socioeconomic problems and, thus, mitigate one of the root causes of terrorism.

Counterterrorism campaigns require enormous resources the Kenyan government is ill-prepared to provide. The United States and other allies must help Kenya build a rapid-response capacity, which would entail massive investments in training and equipment for Kenya's security forces to help combat transnational terrorism effectively as well as to initiate socioeconomic development.

Summary

The Kenyan government employed the instruments of power in the counterterrorism measures after the 1998 US Embassy bombing; however, the perceived notion that Kenya was a victim rather than a source of terrorism existed. After the 2002 terrorist attacks, the government accepted the reality that Kenya was not merely a victim of transnational terrorism but also a source of terrorism and has put greater weight of efforts across the board to effectively combat transnational terrorism threat in the country. The analysis of Kenya's counterterrorism measures shows there is a need to improve and allocate resources to mitigate the threat. The areas the government should focus on include perceived socioeconomic marginalization, religious extremism, and

dismantling the Al Qaeda cells in the country. These factors can be addressed by the effective employment of law-enforcement and intelligence activities, information campaigns, socioeconomic development, legislation, and financial control.

CHAPTER 5.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Kenya has experienced two terrorist attacks within a span of five years. To address the threat of transnational terrorism in Kenya, the government embarked on a systematic counterterrorism program. Using the two terrorist attacks as case studies, this thesis attempted to answer the question as to whether or not the Kenyan government's efforts to fight terrorism are becoming more effective in reducing the transnational terrorist threat in the country. A detailed response to that question should reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the government's counterterrorism strategy and the measures it employs, to draw conclusions, and to make further recommendations on how to strengthen Kenya's counterterrorism strategy.

Conclusions

The research identified the transnational terrorist threats and factors that contribute to terrorism in Kenya. The research established the extent to which, specifically, Al Qaeda operatives, posing as businessmen, Islamic preachers, nongovernmental organization workers, and humanitarian-assistance providers have penetrated the Kenyan community along the Kenyan coast. The analysis revealed that inefficient intelligence capabilities and weak law enforcement enabled terrorists to operate in the country undetected and that the government did not do much to identify and then combat the terrorist threat after the 1998 US Embassy bombing and until the 2002 attacks. While the perception had been that Kenya was a victim rather than a source

of terrorism, after the 2002 terrorist attack, the GoK realized Kenya was not only a victim of terrorism, but also a source. To mitigate the threat and restore the declining economy because of the disruption of the tourism industry, the GoK embarked on a robust counterterrorism campaign.

After the 2002 terrorist attacks, the government employed the traditional and nontraditional instruments of power to mitigate the threat and devised a counterterrorism strategy. The analysis of the government's employment of the instruments of power between the two terrorist attacks in 1998 and 2002 showed an increase in the perceived learning curve. For example, employing diplomacy as an instrument of power showed a perceived learning curve of 0.5 points on a scale of 0-5; the military saw a 1.5-point increase, while law-enforcement and intelligence agencies saw an 0.88-point increase. Overall, the analysis of the governments' counterterrorism measures based on the response of the survey reflects that the government scored 8.6 points between 1998 and 2001 in the employment of the instruments of power as compared to a score of 13.21 points between 2002 and 2004, which is a marked improvement of 4.61 points.

The analysis also established that despite the success of the intelligence and law-enforcement communities in reducing the risks for future attacks, the government failed to enact any significant antiterrorist and financial control legislation. This failure to enact effective antiterrorist legislation was a result of resistance from the Muslim communities who perceived that such legislation would unjustly victimize their community because of their religion. The government's counterterrorism strategy has not been effective in removing the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism recruits, which is the perceived economic imbalance among the Kenyan Muslim population, which enables

terrorists groups to exploit this condition in Kenya. In addition, it was established that corruption in some government institutions, especially in the Immigration Department and the Registrar of Persons, further complicated the government's efforts in its counterterrorism campaign because terrorists continue to obtain Kenyan passports and identity cards because of corruption.

In the Horn of Africa region, the GoK has engaged in a multilateral approach in fighting terrorism in the region through the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) and Intergovernmental Authority and Development (IGAD) by forging a partnership on the war against terrorism with neighboring countries. This multilateral approach has resulted in greater intelligence sharing, especially for the purpose of law enforcement. The GoK has also helped broker the Somalia peace process to help establish a stable government in Somalia. This effort resulted in the election of a transitional national government for Somalia. However, insecurity in Mogadishu and failure to agree on the composition of Africa Union peacekeepers has stalled the relocation of the transitional national government.

Kenya is not currently in a position to effectively monitor and enforce border controls because of its long borders and coastline, especially if Somalia has no stable government with which to forge an effective partnership in controlling the borders. The GoK's worst nightmare in the fight against terrorism remains its inability to establish a stable government in Somalia, which would help prevent terrorists from exploiting the lawless environment there. Despite these shortcomings, the Kenyan counterterrorism strategy is suitable for combating transnational terrorism. However, the GoK must sustain counterterrorism campaigns and address the shortcomings.

Areas for Further Research

Transnational terrorism is an international concern and combating it is complex, expensive, and time-consuming. This thesis identified a number of factors that cause terrorism and further research might help provide a solution to the problem. This thesis recommends further research into understanding why some educated individuals from wealthy backgrounds are susceptible to terrorist recruitment and indoctrination. Understanding the motives of these terrorists would help in developing strategies to combat transnational terrorism.

Recommendations

Through its counterterrorism strategy, the GoK has put in place the ends and ways of fighting transnational terrorism in Kenya. However, the strategy lacks the means to effectively employ the instruments of power to mitigate the threat. Despite this setback, the government's efforts are definitely headed in the right direction to fight terrorism and its strategy has realized gains in disrupting and diminishing the transnational terrorists' ability to conduct attacks in Kenya. To reduce the risks of future terrorist attacks, it is recommended that the government continue to employ more effectively the traditional and nontraditional instruments of power (diplomacy, information, military, economic, law enforcement, intelligence, and legislation) to combat the threat. Terrorists are known to lie in wait and strike when least expected; therefore, the government must be proactive in its overall counterterrorism strategy.

To employ effectively the military as an instrument of power, Kenya should have a centrally located and specially trained counterterrorism response force for quick reaction, both within and outside its borders, if the need arises. This calls for equipping

the military with efficient, effective transportation and communications systems along with providing significant training resources to carry out this mission in addition to patrolling Kenya's borders and coastline.

To improve efficiency in law enforcement and enhance intelligence gathering, the police should be specially trained in counterterrorism techniques and public relations to inculcate a high degree of professionalism when dealing with the public. A professional police force will enhance the public's confidence in the police and forge a more effective partnership to fight terrorism and other crimes in the country. A structured concept of community policing, supported by clear roles of citizens and other stakeholders, will greatly help the public cooperate in providing intelligence. In addition, the government should provide adequate resourcing in terms of vehicles and communication to the police and the intelligence communities to improve their efficiency. The government should also consider building forensic science laboratories to facilitate the effective and efficient processing of evidence. The fingerprint database at the Registrar of Persons should also be interlinked with the criminal investigation department to facilitate quick tracking of suspects. Kenya might not have the resources to adequately train and equip the police and the intelligence community and to establish a forensic laboratory, but it can exploit the goodwill of the US GWOT to help fund programs through the US-sponsored East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative Program.

Despite the crackdown on corruption in the Immigration Department, it is still easy to tamper with the Kenyan passport system. Therefore, the government should procure a new generation of passports that would be foolproof and include the fingerprints of the holder. In addition, the Immigration Department should exercise strict

control on entry points to the country to help guard against undesirable elements entering the country.

To realize a more effective counterterrorism response, the government should strengthen and resource the Kenya National Counterterrorism Center to coordinate all counterterrorism efforts in the country. This would enable the development of a centralized command and control structure to put in place a unified plan for fighting terrorism in the region. Each of the security forces of Kenya, and other agencies involved in counterterrorism efforts, should have representation in the National Counterterrorism Center to direct the most relevant strategic and operational activities down to the tactical forces best suited to act on intelligence. Joint training on counterterrorism and disaster response would improve cooperation among the agencies involved in the counterterrorism campaign as well.

Terrorism finds sanctuary in endemic poverty, which provides a fertile environment for it to operate in the community. To address underlying conditions that promote terrorism in the country, the government should address the real and perceived socioeconomic imbalance within the Muslim community, especially along the Kenyan coast and in the northeastern part of the country. Establishing economic development programs in these areas is critical if there is to be any real progress in mitigating the root causes of terrorism. The economic plan will need to be a long-term initiative because of the financial implications beyond the government's current financial capability. However, encouraging foreign investors through a more favorable economic climate through a modification of foreign investment codes would encourage investors to set up factories that would raise communities' standard of living. In the northeastern province,

setting up a meat processing factory and improving livestock marketing would create jobs and raise the economic standard of the population.

On the coast, reviving collapsed factories and establishing agricultural-based factories would create jobs and raise the standard of living. Also, to facilitate easy transportation for effective commerce, the government should pave the Garissa-Mandera, Isiolo-Moyale, and Garissa-Mombasa roads and construct a rail line connecting Kenya to southern Sudan to tap the economic benefit from the peace in Sudan. For other government-initiated projects to be viable and to mitigate the perceived economic imbalance, there should be comprehensive, community-based, needs-assessment mechanisms to ensure proper accountability and oversight for the use and distribution of development funds.

The government should further embark on an aggressive information campaign to educate the populace on terrorism. The campaign should be aimed at sensitizing the public about the fact that terrorist attacks do not only affect the targeted victim but everyone, either directly or indirectly, not just as potential victims, but also as taxpayers because most of the government resources that would have been invested in development are being diverted to fight terrorism. This information campaign should focus on areas where terrorists have penetrated the community. For the campaign to be effective, the government should enlist the support of prominent Islamic scholars and Islamic organizations, such as the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, the Kenya Assembly of Ulamaa, and the National Union of Kenya Muslims, with a view to incorporating the clerics as a platform to launch

antiterrorism appeals and to build a consensus on an antiterrorism bill. The Muslim clerics are in a better position to educate their followers on the issue of terrorism.

Kenya is a target of transnational terrorism not just because of the presence of US interests in the country, but because of the perceived economic imbalance, which provides fertile grounds for terrorists to exploit. The situation has further been aggravated by deregistration of some Islamic charitable organizations, such as Al-Haramain, which in some parts of the country provided socioeconomic programs to the Muslim communities after the 1998 terrorist attack in Kenya. In this aspect, the United States should implement its Muslim outreach initiative program in Africa to help the GoK in providing social support programs, such as building mosques, schools, hospitals, and water points.

The US has provided resources to fight terrorism in Kenya; however, those resources are inadequate. To enable the GoK to employ effectively the instruments of power to combat transnational terrorism, the US should increase its financial support to Kenya. Doing so would help reduce the current perception that the US is directly involved in counterterrorism measures in Kenya. Finally, the US should increase its intelligence capability in the region by building its language expertise. Employing locals who speak Somali, Swahili, and Arabic in the foreign offices would enhance timely, reliable intelligence gathering within the communities where terrorists have developed networks. Such intelligence should be shared with the GoK for law enforcement actions.

The GoK's efforts alone to fight terrorism will not yield many results unless it engages in a multilateral approach with other East Africa and Horn of Africa countries. In this regard, the government should exploit current good will in the region, play a greater

role in the GWOT, work toward the success of the EACTI, and resolve the current stalemate in the relocation of the new Somali government.

APPENDIX A

COUNTERTERRORISM QUESTIONERS

I am currently attending the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA. While here, I am completing a master's thesis on terrorism in Kenya and the effectiveness of the government's response in the employment of both traditional and nontraditional instrument of power (diplomacy, information, military, economics, law enforcement, intelligence, and financial controls) based on two case studies (the 1998 US Embassy bombing and the 2002 Kikambala hotel bombing and the firing of surface-to air missiles on an Israeli airliner in Mombassa) concerning combating transnational terrorism in Kenya. I am now working on chapter 4, "Analysis", and need of an external survey response to a number of questions to facilitate an objective analysis of the difference in the government's efforts and response after the Embassy bombing and after the hotel bombing 4 years later. The goal of the thesis is to see if there has been a significant learning curve by the Kenyan government after each of the two incidents. Kindly respond to these questions based on your assessment of the effectiveness of the government's response to fighting transnational terrorism in Kenya. The scores ranges are from 0-5 (0 = Not at all effective; 1 = Barely effective; 2 = marginally effective; 3 = fairly effective; 4 = Effective; 5 = Very effective; N/A = Not applicable). Your response will be kept completely anonymous and your identity will not be attributed either in the thesis or to the thesis committee.

Case Study One: The 1998 Embassy Bombing Terrorist Incident

Please respond to the following questions based on the state of Kenya's antiterrorism efforts (1998-2001) in response to the August 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi.

Employment of Diplomacy

With diplomacy being defined as the instrument of national power that builds political will and strengthens international cooperation:

Q1. After the Embassy bombing, how would you rate the government's employment of diplomacy in combating transnational terrorism in Kenya in relation to the following?

International and regional cooperation to identify and dismantle terrorists cells in the Horn of Africa region (0-5 score): _____

Comments: _____

Employment of the Instrument of Information

The goal of an information operations campaign, especially as a key component in any counterterrorism strategy, is to counter or neutralize the terrorists' own information campaign which is designed to build popular support for their cause and gather materiel and personnel support for their operations.

Q2. After the Embassy bombing in 1998, how would you rate the government's employment of the instrument of information in combating transnational terrorism in Kenya in relation to the following?

a. Government efforts to educate the Kenyan public on terrorism and the need to cooperate with law enforcement officials to expose terrorists cells operating in the country (0-5): _____

b. Government efforts to address other perceived factors that cause terrorism, e.g. poverty, unemployment, socio-economic deprivation, (0-5):_____

c. Government efforts to address religious extremism in the country (0-5):_____

Comments:_____

Employment of the Military as an Instrument of National Power

Q3. After the 1998 Embassy bombing, how would you rate the government's employment of the military to combat transnational terrorism in Kenya by identifying and attacking known or suspected terrorist cells and terrorist operations? (0-5):_____

Comments: _____

Employment of Socio-Economic Elements of National Power:

Q4. a. After the 1998 Embassy bombing, how effective was the government in developing plans and policies, and then resourcing them, all aimed at improving the lives of the Kenyan population in general? (0-5): _____

b. After the 1998 embassy bombing, how effective had the government been in developing plans and policies, and then providing the necessary resources, all aimed at improving the lives of those who may be target populations receptive to religious extremism? (0-5): _____

Comments: _____

Employment of Law Enforcement and Intelligence

Q5. a. After the 1998 Embassy bombing, how effective was the government's employment of police and intelligence assets in fighting transnational terrorism in Kenya by identifying, monitoring, and attacking known or suspected terrorist cells and terrorist support organizations ?

(0-5): _____

b. After the 1998 Embassy bombing, how effective was the government's police and intelligence assets in identifying and monitoring religious extremist and their organizations? (0-5): _____

Comments: _____

Employment of Legislation and Financial Controls

Q6. After the 1998 Embassy bombing, how would you rate the employment of legislative and financial controls in relation to the perceived need to enact antiterrorist legislation, such as legislation on financial controls to combat transnational terrorism in Kenya or special judicial processes for terrorism suspects? (0-5): _____

Comments: _____

Case Study Two: 2002 Hotel and Airline Terrorist Incidents

Please respond to the following questions based solely upon the state of Kenya's antiterrorism efforts after the 2002 Kikambala Hotel bombing and the simultaneous missile attack on the Arkia Israeli Airline flight 582 that took off from Mombassa.

Q1. Employment of Diplomacy

With diplomacy being defined as the instrument of national power that builds political will and strengthens international cooperation:

After the hotel bombing and airliner attack, how would you rate the government's employment of diplomacy in combating transnational terrorism in Kenya in relation to the following?

International and regional cooperation to identify and dismantle terrorists cells in the Horn of Africa region (0-5 score): _____

Comments: _____

Q2. Employment of the Instrument of Information

The goal of an information operations campaign, especially as a key component in any counterterrorism strategy, is to counter or neutralize the terrorists' own information campaign which is designed to build popular support for their cause and gather materiel and personnel support for their operations.

After the hotel bombing and airliner attack, how would you rate the government's employment of the instrument of information in combating transnational terrorism in Kenya in relation to the following?

a. Government efforts to educate the Kenyan public on terrorism and the need to cooperate with the law enforcement to expose terrorists cells operating in the country (0-5): _____

b. Government efforts to address other perceived factors that cause terrorism, e.g. poverty, unemployment, socioeconomic deprivation, (0-5): _____

c. Government efforts to address religious extremism in the country (0-5): _____

Comments: _____

Q3. Employment of the Military as an Instrument of National Power

After the hotel bombing and airliner attack, how would you rate the government's employment of the military to combat transnational terrorism in Kenya by identifying and attacking known or suspected terrorist cells and terrorist operations? (0-5): _____

Comments: _____

Q4. Employment of Socioeconomic Elements of National Power:

a. After the hotel bombing and airliner attack, how effective was the government in developing plans and policies, and then resourcing them, all aimed at improving the lives of the Kenyan population in general? (0-5):_____

b. After the hotel bombing and airliner attack, how effective had the government been in developing plans and policies, and then providing the necessary resources, all aimed at improving the lives of those who may be target populations receptive to religious extremism?(0-5):_____

Comments: _____

Q5. Employment of Law Enforcement and Intelligence

a. After the hotel bombing and airliner attack, how effective was the government's employment of police and intelligence assets in fighting transnational terrorism in Kenya by identifying, monitoring and attacking known or suspected terrorist cells and terrorist support organizations? (0-5):_____

b. After the hotel bombing and airliner attack, how effective was the government's police and intelligence assets in identifying and monitoring religious extremist and their organizations? (0-5):_____

Comments: _____

Q6. Legislation and Financial Controls

. a. After the hotel bombing and airliner attack, how would you rate the employment of legislative and financial controls in relation to the

perceived need to enact antiterrorist legislation, such as legislation on financial controls to combat transnational terrorism in Kenya or special judicial processes for terrorism suspects? (0-5): _____

Comments: _____

Thank you very much for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire. I want to reassure you again that the response you provided will be kept in strictest confidence and will not be personally attributed to you.

Thank you in advance for your response.

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